Corporate Financial Distress of Industry Level Listings in an Emerging Market by Vo, Duc Hong et al.
ISSN: 2341-2356 
WEB DE LA COLECCIÓN: http://www.ucm.es/fundamentos-analisis-economico2/documentos-de-trabajo-del-icaeWorking 
papers are in draft form and are distributed for discussion. It may not be reproduced without permission of the author/s.  
 
 
Instituto 
Complutense 
 de Análisis 
Económico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Corporate Financial Distress of Industry  
Level Listings in an Emerging Market 
 
Duc Hong Vo  
Business and Economics Research Group 
Ho Chi Minh City Open University, Vietnam 
 
Binh Vo-Ninh Pham  
Business and Economics Research Group 
Ho Chi Minh City Open University, Vietnam 
 
Trung Vu-Thanh Pham 
Curtin University, Australia 
 
Michael McAleer  
Department of Finance, Asia University, Taiwan and 
Discipline of Business Analytics  University of Sydney Business School,  
Australia and Econometric Institute, Erasmus School of Economics 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands and 
Department of Economic Analysis and ICAE  
Complutense University of Madrid, Spain and 
Institute of Advanced Sciences, Yokohama National University, Japan 
  
Abstract 
Any critical analysis of the corporate financial distress of listed firms in international 
exchange would be incomplete without a serious dissection at the industry level 
because of the different levels of risks concerned. This paper considers the financial 
distress of listed firms at the industry level in Vietnam over the last decade. Two 
periods are considered, namely during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (2007 - 
2009) and post-GFC (2010 - 2017). The logit regression technique is used to 
estimate alternative models based on accounting and market factors. The paper also 
extends the analysis to include selected macroeconomic factors that are expected to 
affect the corporate financial distress of listed firms at the industry level in Vietnam. 
The empirical findings confirm that the corporate financial distress prediction 
model, which includes accounting factors with macroeconomic indicators, performs 
much better than alternative models.  In addition, the evidence confirms that the 
GFC had a damaging impact on each sector, with the Health & Education sector 
demonstrating the most impressive recovery post-GFC, and the Utilities sector 
recording a dramatic increase in bankruptcies post-GFC. 
 
Keywords       Listed firms, industry level, corporate financial distress, bankruptcy, 
distance to default, fundamentals, Global Financial Crisis, Vietnam. 
JEL Classification            F62, F65, G01, G31, G33, G34. 
 
UNIVERSIDAD 
COMPLUTENSE  
MADRID 
 
 
 
Working Paper nº 1909 
March,  2019 
Corporate Financial Distress of Industry  
Level Listings in an Emerging Market* 
 
Duc Hong Vo  
Business and Economics Research Group 
Ho Chi Minh City Open University, Vietnam 
 
 
Binh Vo-Ninh Pham  
Business and Economics Research Group 
Ho Chi Minh City Open University, Vietnam 
 
 
Trung Vu-Thanh Pham 
Curtin University, Australia 
 
 
Michael McAleer**  
Department of Finance, Asia University, Taiwan 
and 
Discipline of Business Analytics  
University of Sydney Business School, Australia 
and 
Econometric Institute, Erasmus School of Economics 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
and 
Department of Economic Analysis and ICAE  
Complutense University of Madrid, Spain 
and 
Institute of Advanced Sciences,  
Yokohama National University, Japan 
 
 
 
 
March 2019 
 
 
 
* For financial support, the fourth author is most grateful to the Australian Research Council and 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Taiwan. 
** Corresponding author: michael.mcaleer@gmail.com  
 
 
 Abstract 
 
Any critical analysis of the corporate financial distress of listed firms in international exchange 
would be incomplete without a serious dissection at the industry level because of the different 
levels of risks concerned. This paper considers the financial distress of listed firms at the industry 
level in Vietnam over the last decade. Two periods are considered, namely during the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) (2007 - 2009) and post-GFC (2010 - 2017). The logit regression 
technique is used to estimate alternative models based on accounting and market factors. The 
paper also extends the analysis to include selected macroeconomic factors that are expected to 
affect the corporate financial distress of listed firms at the industry level in Vietnam. The 
empirical findings confirm that the corporate financial distress prediction model, which includes 
accounting factors with macroeconomic indicators, performs much better than alternative 
models.  In addition, the evidence confirms that the GFC had a damaging impact on each sector, 
with the Health & Education sector demonstrating the most impressive recovery post-GFC, and 
the Utilities sector recording a dramatic increase in bankruptcies post-GFC. 
 
 Keywords: Listed firms, industry level, corporate financial distress, bankruptcy, distance to 
default, fundamentals, Global Financial Crisis, Vietnam. 
JEL: F62, F65, G01, G31, G33, G34. 
 
 
  
  
1. Introduction 
 
A key issue in the analysis of the success or failure of firms in corporate finance is that financial 
distress typically occurs in four sequential stages. The first stage is incubation of the firm’s 
financial situation. In the second stage, management becomes aware of the firm’s financial 
distress, in what is generally called financial embarrassment. The third stage is financial 
insolvency, in which the firm does not have sufficient funds to meet its financial obligations. 
Subsequently, insolvency occurs in the final stage of the so-called corporate financial distress 
cycle. 
 
Various studies have been conducted over the past three decades to predict the corporate 
financial distress of listed firms in international exchanges. The first model based on various 
accounting  ratios was developed by Beaver (1966). The author used a dichotomous 
classification test to determine financial ratios that were intended to predict bankruptcy. Some 
years later, a multivariate statistical model that could distinguish failed firms from non-failed 
firms was developed by Altman (1968). The author examined 22 financial ratios, divided into 
five categories, namely (1) profitability, (2) activity, (3) liquidity, (4) solvency, and (5) leverage. 
A multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) was conducted based on these five categories to 
examine and highlight early warning indicators of corporate financial distress for listed firms. 
 
Another school of empirical studies argued that the major causes of insolvency of listed firms 
were a decline in asset value, a reduction in liquidity, and a decrease in the ability to raise 
capital. This school of thought argued that business default had three components: (1) value of 
assets, (2) asset value of uncertain risks, and (3) financial leverage.  
 
In response to this view, an options-based approach has been developed and widely adopted in 
the commercial world. Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) discuss the call-option 
theory, which is a fundamental theory behind a market-based approach. Their contingent claims 
approach has been widely used in predicting corporate default. 
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Even though numerous empirical studies have been conducted on the corporate financial distress 
of listed firms, the entire market of all listed firms is the key focus of the analysis, especially for 
emerging markets, such as Vietnam and other ASEAN countries. Any critical analysis of the 
corporate financial distress of listed firms would be incomplete without a serious dissection at 
the industry level because of the different levels of risks concerned.  
 
This paper takes a different approach to the analysis by focusing on different sectors of the 
economy. The novelty and originality of the paper arises from a focus on, and empirical analysis 
of, listed firms at the industry level in a specific emerging market, namely Vietnam. 
 
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the 
relevant literature on the issue of corporate financial distress and bankruptcy. The alternative 
models that are considered are discussed and presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the data 
and definitions of the variables used in the empirical analysis. The empirical findings are 
presented and analyzed in Section 5, followed by some concluding remarks and policy 
prescriptions in Section 6.   
 
2. Literature Review   
 
The default risk literature has grown rapidly in recent years, both in the quality and quantity of 
research output. For purposes of predicting bankruptcies, both accounting-based and market-
based approaches have strongly influenced the commercial world. Since the seminal contribution 
by Altman (1968), a large literature related to financial distress has emerged, with multivariate 
discriminant analysis (MDA) used to classify a set of financial ratios into five categories, 
namely: (i) profitability, (ii) activity, (iii) liquidity, (iv) solvency, and (v) leverage. Among 
others, Ohlson (1980) used the logit model, which reflects timing issues and applies less 
restrictive assumptions than does the MDA technique, to measure the default risk for 105 failed 
and 2058 non-failed firms from 1970 to 1976 in the USA.  
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 Similarly, Zmijewski (1984) used accounting variables to measure the proportion of financial 
distress based on the probit regression model and random exogenous sampling. The accounting 
ratios are net income to total assets, total debts to total assets, and current assets to total 
liabilities. In Greece, Theodossiou (1991) used both the logit and probit models for the period 
1975 to 1986 to identify early warning indicators of financial distress. The empirical results 
suggested that the logit model was superior to the probit model in indicating financial distress. 
Some previous papers have predicted future risk using accounting data, including Altman, 
Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977), Altman (2000, 2005), Ugurlu and Aksoy (2006), and Stanisic, 
Mizdrakovic, and Knezevic (2013), among others. 
 
Another stream of risk theory has concentrated on the market-based approach of Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). Future bankruptcy is predicted using the relationship 
between the asset value volatility and the debt ratio. The contingent claims approach used in this 
paper is a fundamental theory for a large number of credit risk models. In some recent studies, 
researchers used a structural model to measure the default risk, followed by an examination of 
the correlations between default risk and other variables. In a related development, Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) examined the precision of the option-based model.  
 
The structural model was compared with a “naïve” alternative model that did not use the default 
probability. The alternative model has been demonstrated to outperform the other models. The 
authors found that the structural model was not a sufficient statistic for purposes of the 
probability of default, whereas its associated functional forms were appropriate for forecasting 
the default probability. In a seminal contribution, Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis 
(2009) calculated the Merton-type bank risk and used VAR analysis to examine the relationship 
between efficiency and risk. The impacts of one standard deviation shocks to the DD on 
inefficiency were found to be negative and substantial.  
 
Similarly, Charitou, Dionysiou, Lambertides, and Trigeorgis (2013) estimated the predictive 
accuracy of the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) bankruptcy model after expanding the model with 
the direct addition of market-observable returns to the company’s market value. The outcome 
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 sheds new light on the simple model, incorporating the direct market-observable variables, which 
performed more strongly than did the relatively complicated model.  
 
In a recent paper, Agrawal, Maheshwari, Khilji, and Swinkels (2016) used logistic regression 
and multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) with the Merton Distance-to-Default (DD) approach 
to match the bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy groups, and predicted the default of the listed firms 
in India. Although the Z-score was added to the model, the Distance-to-Default was still 
significant.  
 
Vasicek (1984), Leland (2002), Crosbie and Bohn (2003), Delianedis and Geske 
(2003), Vassalou and Xing (2004), and Patel and Vlamis (2006), among others, have used the 
contingent claims approach to measure financial distress. 
 
Trujillo-Ponce, Samaniego-Medina, and Cardone-Riportella (2014) showed that the 
comprehensive model, including market-based and accounting-based factors, was the most 
reliable model for predicting financial distress, compared with the Z-core and KMV-Merton 
model. Using 2,186 credit default swaps (CDS) for the European market in both the pre-GFC 
(2002-2006) and GFC (2007-2009) periods, the comprehensive model was used to forecast the 
default probability in the volatile periods. The explanatory power of the models was found to be 
substantially higher during the GFC period.  
 
Furthermore, Allen and Powell (2011) measured the credit risk of 22 listed Canadian and 
Australian banks using the Value-at-Risk (VaR), Conditional VaR (CVaR), Distance-to-Default 
(DD), and Conditional Distance-to-Default (CDD) criteria, in the pre-GFC (2002-2006) and 
GFC (2007-2008) periods. Both countries showed a considerable increase in the probability of 
default between the pre-GFC and GFC periods.  
 
Subsequently, Allen and Powell (2012) applied the same VaR, CVaR, DD and CDD criteria to 
exam the default risk for all sectors forming part of the Australian All Ords Index, which 
includes the 500 largest listed companies and 58 commercial banks, for the pre-GFC (2000-
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 2006) and GFC (2007-2008) periods. Almost all the industries displayed a poorer performance 
during the GFC period.  
 
Byström and Chongsithipol (2005) examined the relationship between the default risk of the 
SET50 firm index on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), as well as firm-specific 
characteristics during the Asian crisis 1996 - 1998 and post-Asian crisis periods, using the 
Merton model. The authors found that the financial distress rose rapidly, and noted the 
contrasting performance among the sectors during the Asian crisis period. The highest risk was 
found in the Finance and securities sector, whereas the lowest risk was found in the Building and 
furnishing material sector.  
 
3. Model Specifications 
 
In order to capture the market-based information, the modified Distance-to-Default (DD) model 
derived by Byström (2006) is used in the empirical analysis.  The foundation of the market-based 
approach is from the Kealhofer, McQuown, and Vasicek (KMV) - Merton (1974) model, which 
was developed based on the option theory of Black and Scholes (1973). Nevertheless, the KMV 
model is based on several stringent assumptions that seem to lack empirical support.  
 
As such, the original model needs to be modified to make it more suitable for emerging markets, 
such as Vietnam. In particular, the default probability should be modelled using three 
parameters, namely the book value of debt, market value, and volatility of equity.  
 
The model is based on the following three assumptions:  
 
(1) Drift term (𝜇 −  0.5 𝜎𝑣 2)𝑇 is small, or close to zero;  
 
(2) N(d1) is assumed to be equal to unity;  
 
(3) Book value of debt is assumed to be the accounting leverage ratio.  
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 Therefore, the new DD model is restructured as follows (Pham et al., 2018): 
 
DD Adjusted Merton = 
𝒍𝒏(𝟏/𝑳)
𝝈𝑬(𝟏−𝑳) = 𝒍𝒏 (𝑳) 𝝈𝑬(𝑳−𝟏)   (1) 
where: 
leverage ratio, L = 
𝐹(𝐸+𝐹) , is calculated according to the market value of equity (E) and the 
book value of debt (F), 
𝜎𝐸   is the volatility of firm equity.   
 
The Cumulative Normal Distribution is used to measure the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) 
from the calculated DD value. The final result will be mapped into the S&P rating, as discussed 
in Lopez (2004). 
 
Three levels of financial distress are defined, as follows:  
 
(1) 𝐷𝐹 (%) ≤ 0.52 %:  Safe zone, where firms have a healthy financial foundation, with 
no risk of bankruptcy; 
 
(2) 0.52 % < 𝐸𝐷𝐹 (%) ≤ 6.94 %:   Grey zone, or warning zone, where the financial 
exposure is at a low level of potential bankruptcy;   
 
(3) 𝐸𝐷𝐹 (%) > 6.94 %:   Bankruptcy zone, or dangerous zone, where the default 
probability is at a high level. 
 
4. Data, ROC Curve and Definition of Variables 
 
4.1 Data and ROC curve 
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 Data for a sample of approximately 800 listed firms on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
(HOSE), and Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX), for the period 2007 to 2017, are obtained from 
Bloomberg for all 10 industries, as well as from the World Bank for the macroeconomic 
variables. Two sub-samples are considered in the empirical analysis, namely the GFC (2007-
2009) and post-GFC (2010 - 2017) periods. 
 
The literature review shows that both the accounting-based and market-based models have 
commendable features, but also suffer from limitations. This paper uses a comprehensive model 
that includes accounting, market and macroeconomic indicators to determine whether the 
performance of the comprehensive model can be improved. In particular, a key difference in this 
paper relative to other empirical studies is the focus on various sectors and industries in Vietnam.  
In the following sections, the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) Curve and relevant R2 
checks are used to examine the efficiency of the model. In particular, the Area Under the ROC 
Curve (AUC) is used in assessing alternative ranking methodologies.  
 
This powerful technique involves direct estimation of predictive accuracy for the logit 
regression. Chava and Jarrow (2004), Vassalou and Xing (2004), and Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008) state that the disparity in the cutoff probability is a major trait of  the ROC curve. The 
ROC curve draws the true positive rate, or the percentage of defaults, that are classified 
accurately as defaults by the model on the y-axis, against the false positive rate, or the percentage 
of defaults that is classified mistakenly by the model, on the x-axis as the threshold of 
bankruptcy.  
 
The AUC estimates the predictive accuracy of the model, with an accuracy ratio that is less than 
0.5 representing a neglected model, and a ratio that is approximately 1 demonstrating a perfectly 
fitting model. Two additional methods for comparing the performance of the estimated models 
are Cox and Snell’s R2 and Nagelkerke’s R2, as discussed in Cox and Snell (1989) and 
Nagelkerke (1991), respectively. These checks are based on a similar concept to the calculation 
of R2 for the linear regression model in measuring the goodness-of-fit of an empirical model. 
 
4.2 Dependent variable 
7 
 
  
Corporate financial distress is defined as a condition whereby a company is not able to meet its 
financial obligations or commitments, and is therefore a process in which a healthy company is 
transformed to one that may be approaching bankruptcy. Firms are called unhealthy when their 
operational profitability is not sufficient to meet their financial obligations. Asquith and 
Scharfstein (1994) stress that the capability of repaying the financial debt of a business is a 
critical problem. Using this concept, the variance between the current maturities of long-term 
debt and a company’s cash flow is used in Whitaker’s (1999) analysis.  
 
Similarly, Pindado (2008) and Tinoco and Wilson (2013) present two requirements for 
recognizing financial distress. The first requirement is the deficit between the earnings before 
interest, tax, and depreciation (EBITDA), and interest expenses. When the financial obligations 
might not be covered by the returns, the firm faces considerable financial risks. The second 
requirement is the negative growth of the market value of a firm’s equity for two consecutive 
years. The firm size, together with the volatility of the market value of their equity, contribute to 
detecting the financial distress of a company.  
 
However, almost all Vietnam listed firms are relatively small by world standards. For example, 
the economic shock or sudden debt requirements arising from short term economic downturns is 
unlikely to be met because the current levels of capital of firms may not be sufficient to meet and 
repay the financial obligations. Consequently, for Vietnam, the variance between the return 
earnings before interest and taxes and interest expenses (that is, the Interest Coverage Ratio) is 
used to estimate the probability of default for each year, with the ratio constrained to lie within 
the range [0, 1]. 
 
The firms identified as being financially healthy are assigned the value of 0, while financially 
distressed firms are accorded the value of 1. Financial distress for each firm is examined for each 
year in the 10-year period 2007-2017 for which the relevant data are available. Consequently, 
each firm in the empirical analysis has 10 observations. Tables 1 and 2 present the results of 
classifications in two stages: 1,572 observations are classified as the non-default group 
(accounting for 86 percent of the observations) in the GFC period (2007 - 2009), and 3,718 
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 observations belonging to the non-default group (accounting for 73 percent of the observations) 
in the post-GFC period (2010 - 2017). 
 
9 
 
   
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of dependent variable during GFC (2007-2009) 
Classify Frequency % Cumulative 
0 1,367 86.96 86.96 
1 205 13.04 100 
Total 1,572 100   
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of dependent variable post--GFC (2010-2017) 
Classify Frequency % Cumulative 
0 3,718 73.23 73.23 
1 1,359 26.77 100 
Total 5,077 100   
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4.3 Explanatory variables 
 
4.3.1 Accounting variables 
 
We construct the model using a range of selected explanatory variables, including financial 
liquidity, profitability, productivity of assets, and solvency, that have appeared in previous 
empirical studies (see, for example, Altman (1968, 2000, 2005), Taffler (1984),  Shumway 
(2001), Hillegeist and Lundstedt (2004), and Wu and Gray (2010), among others).  
 
The variables are given as follows: 
 
(i) the financial , defined as working capital /total assets (WC/TA), is frequently used as 
a measure of corporate liquidity, and provides strong evidence of existing corporate 
defaults; 
  
(ii) the financial ratio, defined as retained earnings over total assets (RE/TA), measures 
the cumulative profitability over time, with young firms usually possessing a low 
value of RE/TA as they have not yet had sufficient time to accumulate substantial 
returns; 
 
(iii) the financial ratio, defined as earnings before interest and taxes over the total asset 
(EBIT/TA), indicates the true productivity of a firm’s assets;  
 
(iv) the ability to meet financial obligations is based on the financial ratio, defined as the 
book value of equity over the total liability (BVE/TL).  
 
These four accounting variables are expected to have individual negative effects on the financial 
distress of listed firms in international exchanges. 
 
4.3.2 Market variables 
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 A set of market variables contributing to enhance the predictive power of the distress model is 
also used. The first market variable is the stock price (PRICE), as discussed in Rees (1995) and 
Beaver (2005). The second variable is the firm size, or the market value of equity (MVE), as 
mentioned in Agarwal and Taffler (2008). The third market variable is the volatility of equity 
(𝜎𝐸). Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) indicate that the higher is the equity volatility, the greater 
will be the asset volatility leading to financial default. The final market variable is the leverage 
ratio (LEVERAGE), which reflects the level of debt used (see Byström, 2006). This ratio is 
computed as the total debt relative to the total market value of equity and total debt. 
 
4.3.3 Macroeconomic variables 
 
In this paper, two macroeconomic variables, namely the short-term Treasury Bill one-year rate 
(SHTBRDEF) and Inflation rate, are included. This choice is carefully considered from the list of 
seven macroeconomic indicators generally used in other empirical studies. The short-term 
Treasury Bill one-year rate is a proxy for the interest rate that may strongly affect industrial 
firms, as discussed in Ali and Daly (2010), Badar and Javid (2013), and Chibi and Ftiti (2015). 
An increase in the Treasury Bill one-year rate leads to an increase in the interest rate, a higher 
cost of financial expenses, and a dramatic increase in the company’s probability of default.  
 
Another macroeconomic indicator that is included in the final model is Inflation. A high inflation 
rate increases the prices of goods and services, thereby leading to an increase in the number of 
firms that end up in financial difficulties (for further details, see Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998), Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano (2006), Mare (2015), and Ćurak and Poposki (2013)). 
 
In summary, a combination of the accounting-based, market-based and macroeconomic variables 
impacting on the financial distress is used to capture various aspects of the default risk. Thus, the 
comprehensive model can be presented, as follows: 
  
𝑌 =  𝛽1
𝑊𝐶
𝑇𝐴
+ 𝛽2 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴  + 𝛽4 𝐵𝑉𝐸𝑇𝐿 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑉𝐸) + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 
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 + 𝛽7𝜎𝐸 +  𝛽8𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 + 𝛽9 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀 
 
where: 
 
𝑌 (𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑦): binary variable denoting non-default (Y = 0) and default (Y = 1)  
 
 
𝑊𝐶
𝑇𝐴
 : Working Capital to Total Assets   
 
 
𝑅𝐸
𝑇𝐴
  : Retained Earnings to Total Assets  
 
 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝐴
   : Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (operating profit) to Total Assets  
 
 
𝐵𝑉𝐸
𝑇𝐿
     : Book Value of Equity to Total Liabilities  
 
  
𝑀𝑉𝐸     : Market Value of Equity 
 
 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸  : Leverage ratio 
 
 
𝜎𝐸          : Volatility of Equity 
 
  
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸       : Stock Price 
 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙: Short-term Treasury Bill one-year rate 
 
  
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛    : Inflation rate 
 
 
𝜀            : random error term. 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics for explanatory variables during GFC (2007-2009) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Working capital/total asset 0.252 0.224 -0.499 0.998 
Retained earnings /asset  0.061 0.067 -0.437 0.422 
EBIT /Total assets 0.060 0.074 -0.129 0.664 
Book value of equity / Total liabilities 0.712 0.284 0.001 1.000 
Price 30594 33927 317 304820 
Ln (Market value of equity) 12.221 2.025 6.994 22.284 
Volatility of equity 4940 10900 20.123 336000 
Leverage 1.413 1.313 0.003 12.551 
Inflation 12.9 7.2 7.3 23.1 
Treasury Bill 8.1 3.3 4.2 12.1 
Source: This paper. 
 
 
Table 4 
Summary statistics for explanatory variables post-GFC (2010-2017) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Working capital/total asset 0.198 0.243 -1.362 1.000 
Retained earnings /asset  0.032 0.148 -2.760 0.529 
EBIT /Total assets 0.024 0.071 -2.290 0.981 
Book value of equity / Total liabilities 0.649 0.313 -0.568 1.000 
Price 17300 18740 400 202000 
Ln (Market value of equity) 12.129 1.872 6.947 21.136 
Volatility of equity 6836 98955 18.4 530000 
Leverage 0.886 1.012 0.004 11.315 
Inflation 7.4 5.4 0.9 18.6 
Treasury Bill 7.5 3.1 4.0 12.4 
Source: This paper.  
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Tables 3 and 4 report the summary statistics for the explanatory variables in both the GFC and 
post-GFC periods. The descriptive statistics include the mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum for WCTA (working capital over total assets), RETA (retained earnings over total 
assets), EBITTA (earnings before interest and taxes (operating profit) to total assets), BVETA 
(book value of equity to total liabilities), MVE (market value of firm equity), PRICE (stock 
price), VOL_MVE (volatility of the market value of equity), LEVERAGE (leverage ratio), 
INFLATION (inflation), and SHTBRDEF (short-term Treasury Bill one-year rate).  
 
5. Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
This paper considers the financial distress of Vietnam listed firms under different economic 
circumstances and for two sub-periods, namely the GFC (2007 – 2009) and post-GFC (2010 - 
2017) periods. Tables 5 and 7 present the results of a logit regression of financial distress for 
both the GFC and post-GFC periods. Alternative models have been used to consider the separate 
effects from accounting factors, market-based factors, and macroeconomic factors on financial 
distress and bankruptcy for the Vietnam listed firms. In addition, on account of the high 
correlation between Inflation and the Short-term Treasury Bill one-year rate, various models are 
estimated to try to ameliorate the correlation among the variables.  
 
The following models are estimated in the paper: 
 
(1) Model 1: all explanatory accounting variables; 
(2) Model 2: all market variables; 
(3) Model 3: all accounting variables plus inflation; 
(4) Model 4: all accounting variables plus the short-term Treasury Bill one-year rate; 
(5) Model 5: all market variables plus inflation;  
(6) Model 6: all market variables plus the short-term Treasury Bill one-year rate; 
(7) Model 7: all accounting and market variables plus inflation; 
(8) Model 8: all accounting and market variables plus the short-term Treasury Bill one-
year rate.  
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Substantial differences can be observed between the two periods with regard to the statistical 
significance of some explanatory variables. During the GFC period, Models 3 and 4 have only 
one accounting variable and two macroeconomic indicators that are statistically significant at 
significance levels of 1 per cent to 10 per cent.  
 
The earnings before interest and taxes over the total asset (EBIT/TA) variable has a negative 
impact, which represents the productivity of the company’s assets, excluding the tax and 
leverage components or the earning power of the asset. This highlights that the higher is the level 
of EBIT, the higher is its performance, and therefore the lower is the probability of default.  
 
Two macroeconomic indicators, including the inflation rate and short-term Treasury Bill one-
year rate, have positive impacts. The higher is the value of inflation indicates the higher is the 
likelihood of financial distress. Surprisingly, these variables remain unchanged with regard to the 
signs and levels of significance after the GFC crisis. In particular, all of the accounting variables 
are statistical significant in the post-GFC period, including the net financial liquidity of the 
firm’s assets (W C/TA), profitability (RE/TA), productivity of the company’s assets (EBIT/TA), 
and the capability of covering the financial debt (BVE/TL).  
 
For the market-based approach, as presented in Models 5 and 6, there is no evidence of the 
relationship between the market variables and the default probability during the GFC. However, 
three market variables, including Price (PRICE), Market value of equity (MVE), and the 
Leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), have significant effects on financial distress in the post-GFC 
period. 
 
Tables 6 and 8 present measures of model performance for the eight models for both the GFC 
and post-GFC periods. All of the models are found to be useful in measuring financial distress 
for the listed firms in Vietnam because of the high accuracy ratio (AR>0.5). The best model for 
the two periods is Model 3, which includes the accounting and macroeconomic variables, with 
the highest AR value of 0.9075 (GFC) and 0.9395 (post-GFC). Furthermore, two critical checks 
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 of the logistic regression, namely Nagelkerke’s R 2 and Cox and Snell’s R 2, confirm that the best 
empirical model in both periods is Model 3.  
 
 
Table 5 
Financial distress of Vietnam listed firms during GFC (2007-2009) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
WCTA -0.03 
 
-0.161 -0.142 
  
-0.198 -0.194 
  (0.05)   (0.28) (0.25)     (0.34) (0.34) 
RETA -3.813   -3.867 -3.446     -3.193 -3.093 
  (1.49)   (1.46) (1.33)     (1.17) (1.15) 
EBITTA -97.532   -100.221 -98.611     -100.968 -99.567 
  (10.70)***   (10.36)*** (10.50)***     (10.26)*** (10.38)*** 
BVETL 0.168   0.155 0.16     0.186 0.183 
  (0.41)   (0.36) (0.38)     (0.37) (0.37) 
PRICE   0.000     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (1.94)*     -1.53 -0.94 -0.16 -0.23 
MVE   0.102     0.108 0.095 -0.055 -0.064 
    (1.44)     (1.51) (1.31) (0.70) (0.83) 
VOL_MVE   0.000     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.33)     (0.26) (0.22) (0.29) (0.32) 
LEVERAGE   -0.173     -0.167 -0.143 -0.027 -0.011 
    (1.60)     (1.53) (1.30) (0.19) (0.08) 
INFLATION     0.039   0.024   0.036                 
      (2.66)***   (1.88)*   (2.34)**                 
SHTBRDEF       0.095   0.094   0.093 
        (2.54)**   (2.79)***   (2.16)**  
_cons 0.004 -3.525 -0.472 -0.818 -4.006 -4.475 0.257 -0.055 
  (0.01) (4.37)*** (1.33) (1.84)* (4.61)*** (4.90)*** (0.26) (0.05) 
lnsig2u_cons 0.057 1.127 0.291 0.203 1.184 1.223 0.333 0.264 
  (0.09) (4.48)*** (0.51) (0.35) (4.68)*** (4.84)*** (0.59) (0.46) 
N 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses:  
*** p<0.01, ** <0.05, * p<0.1 
      Source: This paper. 
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Table 6 
Model performance measures for GFC (2007-2009) 
Measure  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
ROC 0.9061 0.6041 0.9075 0.9072 0.5888 0.5962 0.9073 0.9071 
-2 Log Likelihood 736 1201 730 731 1199 1197 730 731 
Cox and Snell’s R2  0.264 0.01 0.267 0.266 0.011 0.013 0.266 0.266 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.489 0.019 0.495 0.494 0.021 0.024 0.494 0.494 
Source: This paper. 
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Table 7 
Financial distress of Vietnam listed firms post-GFC (2010-2017) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
WCTA -0.91 
 
-0.883 -0.878 
  
-0.866 -0.856 
  (2.71)***   (2.60)*** (2.58)***     (2.54)** (2.51)**  
RETA -2.617   -3.048 -3.119     -2.822 -2.834 
  (4.31)***   (4.71)*** (4.78)***     (4.28)*** (4.31)*** 
EBITTA -181.231   -185.327 -186.046     -184.921 -185.308 
  (23.00)***   (22.79)*** (22.80)***     (22.58)*** (22.61)*** 
BVETL -0.652   -0.665 -0.676     -0.973 -0.965 
  (2.44)**   (2.45)** (2.49)**     (3.07)*** (3.04)*** 
PRICE   0.000     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (6.19)***     (6.29)*** (6.15)*** -0.71 -1.1 
MVE   -0.295     -0.306 -0.309 -0.051 -0.051 
    (6.01)***     (6.17)*** (6.23)*** (1.03) (1.04) 
VOL_MVE   0.000     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.76)     (0.82) (0.82) (0.07) (0.11) 
LEVERAGE   -0.181     -0.181 -0.171 0.189 0.175 
    (2.26)**     (2.25)** (2.12)** (1.88)* (1.75)*   
INFLATION     0.054   -0.02   0.053                 
      (5.43)***   (2.60)***   (5.26)***                 
SHTBRDEF       0.095   -0.048   0.094 
        (5.39)***   (3.62)***   (5.26)*** 
_cons 1.129 2.507 0.782 0.49 2.795 3.019 1.496 1.239 
  (6.38)*** (4.58)*** (4.14)*** (2.30)** (4.98)*** (5.30)*** (2.42)** (1.97)**  
lnsig2u_cons 0.622 1.298 0.651 0.647 1.302 1.308 0.675 0.673 
  (3.78)*** (12.38)*** (3.91)*** (3.88)*** (12.39)*** (12.46)*** (4.05)*** (4.02)*** 
N 5077 5077 5077 5077 5077 5077 5077 5077 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses:  
*** p<0.01, ** <0.05, * p<0.1 
      Source: This paper. 
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Table 8 
Model performance measures for post-GCD (2010-2017) 
Measure  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
ROC 0.9379 0.682 0.9395 0.9394 0.682 0.6813 0.9384 0.9385 
-2 Log likelihood  3154.15 5473.52 3125.7 3125.04 5465.1 5462.87 3121.37 3120.03 
Cox and Snell’s R2  0.418 0.08 0.422 0.421 0.082 0.082 0.421 0.422 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.608 0.117 0.613 0.613 0.119 0.12 0.613 0.612 
Source: This paper. 
 
 
Table 9 
Overall Distance to Default in all sectors for the full sample (2007-2017) 
Sector No. of Observations Safe Grey  Bankruptcy 
Energy 319 41.4% 6.6% 52.0% 
Materials 885 47.2% 5.2% 47.6% 
Industrials 2,596 47.1% 5.5% 47.5% 
Consumer Discretionary 484 46.9% 6.8% 46.3% 
Consumer Staples 911 40.4% 7.0% 52.6% 
Health & education 176 62.5% 3.4% 34.1% 
Financials 882 49.2% 4.3% 46.5% 
Technology 115 51.3% 5.2% 43.5% 
Telecommunication 104 53.8% 2.9% 43.3% 
Utilities 139 41.2% 7.6% 51.1% 
 Total 6,611    
   Source: This paper.  
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Table 10 
Overall Distance to Default in all sectors for GFC (2007-2009) 
Sector No. of Observations Safe Grey Bankruptcy 
Energy 73 38.4% 12.3% 49.3% 
Materials 197 42.6% 5.1% 52.3% 
Industrials 646 42.0% 6.0% 52.0% 
Consumer Discretionary 115 37.4% 8.7% 53.9% 
Consumer Staples 229 40.2% 8.3% 51.5% 
Health & education 50 20.0% 8.0% 72.0% 
Financials 163 49.1% 3.7% 47.2% 
Technology 31 35.5% 6.5% 58.1% 
Telecommunication 27 33.3% 7.4% 59.3% 
Utilities 34 61.8% 17.6% 20.6% 
  1,565    
   Source: This paper. 
 
Table 11 
Overall Distance to Default in all sectors for post-GFC (2010-2017) 
Sector No. of Observations Safe Grey Bankruptcy 
Energy 246 42.3% 4.9% 52.8% 
Materials 688 48.5% 5.2% 46.2% 
Industrials 1,950 48.8% 5.3% 45.9% 
Consumer Discretionary 369 49.9% 6.2% 43.9% 
Consumer Staples 682 40.5% 6.6% 52.9% 
Health & education 126 79.4% 1.6% 19.0% 
Financials 719 49.2% 4.5% 46.3% 
Technology 84 57.1% 4.8% 38.1% 
Telecommunication 77 61.0% 1.3% 37.7% 
Utilities 105 36.2% 5.7% 58.1% 
  5,056    
    Source: This paper. 
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Any discussion of the corporate financial distress of listed firms in international exchanges 
would be incomplete without the presentation of an analysis at the industry level because of 
different levels of risks associated with the listings. Listed firms are then divided into ten 
different sectors, as classified by the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), and their 
observations are also classified into three levels of financial distress based on a modified 
Distance-to-Default (DD) model, as presented in Table 9.  
 
The highest risk industry belongs to Consumer Staples, which includes Food & Staples 
Retailing, Household & Personal Products, and Food Beverage & Tobacco, with a 59.6 percent 
indicator of financial distress (that is, in the Grey or Bankruptcy zones). Utilities, Consumer 
Discretionary, and Energy is a relatively high risk industry, with an indicator of financial distress 
of approximately 50 percent. In contrast, the lowest exposure industry belongs to the Health & 
Education sector, with an indicator of financial distress of 33.8 per cent.  
 
Tables 10 and 11 report the results of the DD analysis for both periods.  It is noticeable that the 
GFC had a damaging impact in each sector. Table 10 shows that almost all the sectors have 
higher financial risks, with the probability of default (that is, in the Grey or Bankruptcy zones) 
being nearly 50 percent higher during the GFC than the post-GFC period. The highest 
bankruptcy rate is the Health & Education (at 80 per cent) industry, while the lowest bankruptcy 
rate belongs to Utilities (at 38.2 per cent) during the GFC. 
 
Table 11 provides the probability of distress in the post-GFC period, which indicates a tendency 
to decline sharply in all the sectors, except for the Utilities sector. The Health & Education sector 
demonstrates the most impressive recovery in the post-GFC period, with the probability of 
default decreasing substantially from around 80 percent to 20 percent as a result of the use of 
modern technology.  
 
On the other hand, the Utilities sector, which includes Residential & Industrial Electrics, Water, 
and Gas & Oil, recorded a dramatic increase in the bankruptcy rate in the post-GFC period. 
During the GFC, the sector had the lowest risk among all the sectors. It is worth noting that the 
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 sector is dominated by state-owned firms that are financially funded directly by the Vietnam 
Government. However, the loss of economic stimulus packages from the Vietnam Government, 
together with the strong equitability trend of the state-owned companies, are crucial factors in the 
sharp increases in the bankruptcy rate during the post-GFC period, with the highest bankruptcy 
rate of 63.8 percent.  
 
The financial sector has been predicted to remain stable after the GFC. The financial distress has 
decreased slightly by around one percent. The root cause of the serious distress is primarily the 
poor performance of the banking system. It should be stressed that almost all commercial banks 
were heavily affected by the GFC, as well as the restructuring of the banking system by 
government policymakers.  
 
The Basel II Accord is a set of international banking standards derived from the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Basel II improves on Basel I by requiring large 
cash reserves from commercial banks to cover potential risks. Applying Basel II for commercial 
banks provides ample evidence of the tightening of risky behaviour relating to bank 
management. Several inherent weaknesses of commercial banks could be discovered after the 
GFC led to the M&A action among banks. In order to ensure the safety of the banking system, 
the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) has decided to apply special controls to commercial banks that 
have a high rate of non-performing loans (NLPs).  
 
6. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications  
 
Numerous studies have been conducted over the last four decades regarding the relationships 
underlying corporate financial distress. Any discussion of the corporate financial distress of 
listed firms in international exchanges would be incomplete without a critical analysis at the 
industry level because of the different level of risks among the industries. In this paper, listed 
firms were divided into ten different sectors, as classified by the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS). 
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 The paper considered the financial distress of Vietnam listed firms at the industry level during 
the last decade. In order to consider the changes, if any, on the level of corporate financial 
distress in Vietnam, two distinct periods were considered, namely the period of the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) (2007 - 2009) and the post-GFC period (2010 - 2017). A logit regression 
technique was used for empirical estimation. Several alternative models were used to consider 
the separate effects arising from accounting and market-based factors. An extension of the model 
in the paper included an analysis of selected macroeconomic factors that affected the corporate 
financial distress of listed firms in any international exchange at the industry level in Vietnam, 
including Inflation and the Short-term one-year rate. 
 
In general, the empirical findings from the paper confirmed that the corporate financial distress 
prediction model of Vietnam listed firms at the industry level, which includes accounting factors 
with macroeconomic indicators, appeared to perform much better than did the financial distress 
model comprising market-based factors with macroeconomic fundamentals. 
 
In addition, the empirical findings presented evidence to confirm that the GFC had a destructive 
impact on each sector.  Almost all sectors of the Vietnam economy had financial risk that was 
approximately 50 percent higher during the GFC period than in the post-GFC period. Of all the 
sectors in Vietnam, the highest bankruptcy rate was found to be in the Health & Education sector 
(at 80 per cent), while the lowest risk was found in the Utilities (at 38.2 per cent) during the GFC 
period.   
 
For the post-GFC period, the probability of distress showed a tendency to decline sharply for all 
sectors of the Vietnam economy, except for the Utility sector. The Health & Education sector 
demonstrated the most impressive recovery after the GFC, where the probability of default 
decreased from approximately 80 percent during the GFC period (2007 - 2009) to around 20 
percent for the post-GFC period (2010 - 2017).  
 
The Utilities sector recorded a dramatic increase in bankruptcies after the GFC. During the GFC 
period, the sector had the lowest risk among all the sectors. It is worth noting that the sector is 
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 dominated by state-owned firms that are financially funded directly by the Vietnam Government. 
In addition, the Financial sector is likely to remain stable after the GFC. 
 
The empirical findings provide additional evidence for the Vietnam Government, as well as 
those from other emerging markets, to examine and evaluate the risk of the corporate financial 
distress of listed firms in any international exchange, especially at the industry level. For the case 
of Vietnam, Utilities should receive special attention as the sector exhibits a high level of risk 
without adequate support from the Government. Any reform of this sector, without an 
accompanying comprehensive analysis of risk, will carry a significant level of risk, which would 
be likely to flow on to the economy as the whole.  
 
In marked contrast, the Financial sector appeared to be strong, both during and after the GFC. 
This observation confirms the robustness of the existing regulatory framework for the banking 
sector in Vietnam.  
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Appendix I 
Correlation matrix and diagnostics during crisis, 2007 -2009 
Variable WCTA RETA EBITTA BVETL PRICE MVE VOL_MVE LEVERAGE INFLATION SHTBRDEF 
WCTA 1 
         RETA 0.179*** 1                 
EBITTA 0.1327*** 0.4286*** 1               
BVETL 0.311*** 0.3292*** 0.2256*** 1             
PRICE 0.0252 0.2473***  -0.0409* 0.0009 1           
MVE  -0.0676*** 0.1801***  -0.0614** 0.0153 0.4606*** 1         
VOL_MVE -0.0319 0.0265 0.0532** 0.0352 0.0018 0.1522*** 1       
LEVERAGE 0.1501*** 0.3271*** 0.1655*** 0.4815*** 0.4028*** 0.5012*** 0.1654*** 1     
INFLATION 0.0403  -0.067*** 0.0587** 0.0207  -0.2242***  -0.1264*** 0.0153  -0.0939*** 1   
SHTBRDEF -0.0093  -0.0541** 0.0252 0.0014  -0.3355***  -0.1446*** 0.0197  -0.1874*** 0.8445*** 1 
Notes:  WCTA (working capital over total assets), RETA (retained earnings over total assets), EBITTA (earnings before interest and taxes 
[operating profit] to total assets), BVETA (book value of equity to total liabilities), MVE (market value of equity), PRICE (stock price), 
VOL_MVE (volatility of market value of equity), LEVERAGE (leverage ratio), INFLATION (inflation), and SHTBRDEF (short-term one-
year rate). 
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Appendix II 
Correlation matrix and diagnostics post crisis, 2010 -2017 
Variable WCTA RETA EBITTA BVETL PRICE MVE VOL_MVE LEVERAGE INFLATION SHTBRDEF 
WCTA 1 
         RETA 0.4308*** 1                 
EBITTA 0.1529*** 0.2529*** 1               
BVETL 0.5473*** 0.385*** 0.1602*** 1             
PRICE 0.1909*** 0.3431*** 0.184*** 0.1787*** 1           
MVE 0.0679*** 0.326*** 0.1105*** 0.0951*** 0.4618*** 1         
VOL_MVE -0.0117 0.0167 0.0124 0.0223 0.0624*** 0.2053*** 1       
LEVERAGE 0.3091*** 0.2879*** 0.1927*** 0.5721*** 0.3882*** 0.3435*** 0.2126*** 1     
INFLATION 0.0197 0.0948*** 0.0256* 0.0175  -0.1063***  -0.083*** -0.0007 -0.0387 1   
SHTBRDEF 0.0316* 0.119*** 0.0494*** 0.029**  -0.0648***  -0.0576*** 0.0007 0.0015 0.91 1 
Notes:  WCTA (working capital over total assets), RETA (retained earnings over total assets), EBITTA (earnings before interest and taxes 
[operating profit] to total assets), BVETA (book value of equity to total liabilities), MVE (market value of equity), PRICE (stock price), 
VOL_MVE (volatility of market value of equity), LEVERAGE (leverage ratio), INFLATION (inflation), and SHTBRDEF (short-term one-
year rate). 
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